7 Appendix I: Ultimate Reality and the Self in Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism

Ultimate Reality and the Self in Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism

Svabhāva and Ātman or Śūnyatā and Anātman

In this chapter, we will look at arguments from two towering figures within Indian philosophy of religion, the Mādhyamaka Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c 150 – c 250 CE) and the Advaita Vedānta Hindu philosopher Adi Śańkara (c 700 – c 750 CE) regarding the nature of Ultimate Reality itself and our relationship to it. These two have opposing stances regarding whether or not there is an essential quality to the Self that substantially binds it the utmost fabric of Ultimate Reality itself.  This matter lies at the heart of the difference between Buddhist and Hindu religious philosophies. Classical Indian debates around whether or not the Self has a fixed nature that binds it to Ultimate Reality often hinge upon the degree to which we can talk about people or the universe having what one might call a quintessential essence. For example, we may think that all apples share some quintessential essence of “appleness” which in part defines and gives meaning to the shared connectedness of all the granny-smiths, red-deliciouses, and pink ladies of the world. As we shall see, whether or not some fixed essence can be attributed to our very selves and all which is real became, in Indian philosophy of religion, point at which major religious views diverged.

Philosophical argumentation regarding religious subject matter, such as the existence of God and the nature of Ultimate Reality has a rich and expansive tradition in India. In India and the surrounding areas, a particular philosophical point became increasingly pivotal within larger religious discussions regarding religion, ultimate reality, and what constitutes spiritual insight into the nature of oneself and one’s place in the cosmos. Some themes overlap with those found within other monotheistic-centered discussions. For example, Śańkara and the Nyaya Philosopher Vāchaspati Mishra (900 – 980 AD) both provided rationalist, teleological arguments for the existence of a semi-personalized creator-God, Ishvara (see Guha and Phillips, 2021), while others such as those from the Samkhya and Mimamsaka schools present arguments against a theistic position.  The particular point under debate which this chapter examines is whether or not each of us, or really anything at all, has an enduring and substantive Self, and the way in which this Self, if it exists, relates to the fundamental fabric of Reality.

To present this topic this chapter will first explain a key concept, svabahāva, or inherently existing essence. Because Indian philosophy and religion operates with different assumptions and priorities than are often encountered within Euro-American views, this chapter will provide some situating historical context for the religions. It will supply a brief sketch of the common origins and later divergence between Hinduism and Buddhism. After this, Nāgārjuna’s arguments against an eternal substantive self will be presented. Finally, we will look at Śańkara’s arguments for the necessity of postulating a substantive self.

Those in agreement with a traditional Hindu view and Śańkara’s position hold that our deepest selves and that-which-is-most-real both expresses svabahāva – meaning “own-being” or possession of an inherent essence of intrinsic existence. The idea here is that at our deepest core we have an enduring and substantive self holding the essence of who we really are. Following a classical Hindu position, Śańkara presents arguments for the conclusion that Ultimate Reality is best conceived of has expressing this permanent, unchanging and intrinsically self-sustaining existence. This Ultimate Reality is called Brahman. This is the bottom level reality underlaying all that is real. Furthermore, according to Śańkara everyone participates in, and is an expression of, Brahman through being part of an eternal cosmic self, ātman, which is fundamentally identical to Brahman in its expression of svabahāva.

In the opposite direction, the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna argues that nothing has self-independent existence. Svabahāva, then, is a characteristic that doesn’t apply to our deepest selves or Ultimate Reality. Rather, all that ultimately exists is a product of a web of relationships. Everything, including our supposedly deepest self and even Ultimate Reality, are products of conditions, interactions, and relationships. Further analysis into these parts, moreover, yields more relationships in a never-ending descent of inquiry. It’s relationships all the way down! Anything beyond this is best thought of as just empty. There is no svabahāva bedrock to reality. Therefore, Nāgārjuna and those of the Madhymaka school of Buddhism whom he influenced refer to Ultimate Reality as expressing sunyata, often translated as “emptiness.” This further applies to our very selves. Nāgārjuna presents an argument for the Buddhist “no-self” or anātman position. Like everything, Nāgārjuna argues, our selves are empty of a permanent and unchanging core.

• • Questions to Consider
    • What instances can you think of where it seems reasonable to appeal to a thing’s essence as means to better understanding it?
    • Can you think of examples of things where it would not be appropriate to attribute an essence or essential nature a thing?
    • Is there anything we might say “inherently exists” on its own?
    • To what degree does the topic of svabahāva share common points with the Ontological Argument and Kant’s critique of existence being used as a predicate?

An Introduction to Dharmic Religions

It is helpful to first approach the ātman versus anātman discussion introducing the ancient religious cannon known as the Vedas. The Vedas are a collection of Sanskrit texts that were compiled over the course of nearly one thousand years. Vedas from the early time period of 1,200 – 900 BCE generally include invocations to elemental forces and deities, as well as prescriptions and instructions for ritual observation. There are four main Vedas: The Rg Veda, Sama Veda, Yajur Veda, and Atha Veda. Each Veda itself consists of various sections which include an initial description of ceremony and ritual and latter sections of commentaries upon these earlier parts. The oldest of the Vedas, the Rg Veda, originates from approximately 1,200 BCE. Through hymns and poems, it and other earlier Vedas describe the nature-worshipping religion of the Indo-Aaryan people who settled the Indus valley. Initially descending from oral tradition, the Vedas were believed to be eternal and either authorless or of direct, divine creation. Whether subsequent philosophies proceeded through modified acceptance of the Vedic ideas (Advaita Vedanta) or a rejection of Vedic authority (Buddhism, Jainism) in the Indian tradition, the Vedas stand as the preeminent starting point for philosophical investigation into religious matters. For this reason, religions with this common intellectual heritage (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism) are often grouped together under term dharmic religions.

From between 900 – 200 BCE an important part of the Vedas, The Upanishads were created. The Upanishads are philosophical commentaries upon the early Vedas and Vedic sections. The Upanishads express many of the themes common (either in their acceptance or their rejection) to the dharmic religions. As exhibited in The Upanishads, during this period religious thought moves from polytheism to include expressions of an absolute monotheism or pantheism focusing upon Brahman as the ultimate, divine, expression of reality itself. Brahman is self-contained in its svabahāva (again, “own-being” or possessing of inherent essence of intrinsic existence). Brahman, when conceived of in its utmost, absolute sense is referred to as Nirguna Brahman. Nirguna Brahman is beyond limit, quality, or attributes. Anything that could be said, or even thought about Nirguna Brahman falls short of what it really is.

If you think the unqualifiable nature of Nirguna Brahman makes it hard to wrap one’s head around, you are partially correct; indeed, it is common to discuss Nirguna Brahman in terms of what it is not, rather than aim and miss at describing what it is. For this reason, people frequently follow the Vedic figure Yājnavalkya in how he refers to Nirguna Brahman by using the method of via negativa – by giving a descripting through stating what a thing is not. Yājnavalkya’s famous formulation for this is Neti, neti – “not this, not this” and is found in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. The idea behind Yājnavalkya’s via negativa method, as well as other examples of via negativa from other religions, is that by peeling away layers of attribution from the thing itself we eventually arrive at an indescribable, but somehow understood view of that which is beyond qualification; such as Nirguna Brahman.

Stepping down a level of abstraction, as it were, when we encounter Brahman in a form more easily grasped by human intellect. We find a conception of Brahman called Saguna Brahman. Saguna Brahman is the pinnacle of the divine when it is thought of in some imaginable form. Although it varies widely depending on the religious school within Hinduism, often times the highest Gods are thought of as expressions of Saguna Brahman. Aspects of the more familiar Hindu pantheon, such as the ultimate, Creator-Lord, Ishvara, as well as the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva are typically understood as themselves being aspects of Saguna Brahman. This chapter will pass over the more devotional (bhakti) and polytheistic spiritual paths of Hinduism and focus on the monistic side of Advaita Vendānta which solely concerns itself with Brahman and ātman and forgoes lingering too much upon anthropomorphic conceptions of the divine. Here, a key term is often used to describe Brahman (to the best of one’s ability): Sachchidānda. This term is a compound of Sat (Existence), Chit (Consciousness) and Ānandam (Bliss). Ultimate Reality, Brahman, is an infinite sea of existence, consciousness, and bliss. There is no consensus as to whether Sachchidānda refers to Nirguna Brahman or the more conceptually accessible mode recognizing ultimate reality, Saguna Brahman; however, what is important for us to note is that Brahman is conceived of in a way that deeply connects with ideas we often use to describe conscious states and the mind.

In addition to presenting views about Ultimate Reality and Brahman, The Upanishads provide a set of beliefs regarding human existence. In The Upanishads, everyday people are viewed as having individual souls. The term most frequently used for souls is jivātmās. According to The Upanishads, our souls are bound to incarnate bodies and are subject to the desires, pains, pleasures, and whatnot of human existence. However, underlying the isolate reality of the jivātmās everyone also participates in, and is an expression of, the universal, eternal, unchanging, inner-self, known as ātman. Ātman is that which is manifested by an individual soul in the first place. To explain, consider how we might think of ourselves that we have a head, a heart, lungs, and a personal disposition for thinking deeply about philosophy. When asked who it is that has such body parts and psychological attributes, we might say, well, I do, or my self does. We pair things into a subject/object or owner/attribute set of relationships. But if we apply the same subject/object, owner/attribute expectation again to the question, “and to whom or what is this “self” an attribute of?,” then The Upanishads would say something like, selves are had by the fundamental, deeper common Self known as atman. Just as “I” unifies attributes like having certain physical and psychological traits, Atman is what unifies everything one step further along the level of inquiry. Each person or jivā is an unique expression of an underlying and unifying self.

The metaphor of waves as being part of the deeper sea is a somewhat popular statement to express the idea. Every wave is unique, but it is also an expression of, and is constituted by, the sea. This metaphor even occurs in Śańkara’s writing: “For instance, waves, foam, etc. are non-different, being alike seawater; yet as waves and foam they are different from each other” (Brahma Sutra Bhāsya, 2.1.13). Here, seawater stands for the Brahman. According to The Upanishads, our deepest self, and all that is real share an underlying connection to Ultimate Reality. When encountered by looking inwardly at who and what our deepest self is, this eternal essence is ātman. When encountered outwardly in the world, as the reality behind all that is real, we find Brahman. Both, according to The Upanishads, are the same all-pervasive thing. The true identity of the two is expressed by the iconic phrase, tat tvam asi – “that art thou.”

There are a few other notions within The Upanishads that help give context to the discussion of Brahman and Ātman in Indian philosophy. The notion of an eternal, cosmic law and order of things, called the dharma, is also evident in The Upanishads. Dharma describes how the consequences of one’s actions relate to reincarnation of one’s jivā in terms of karma resulting from previous actions. Human existence is presented in terms of cyclical reincarnation due to karma. Constant return in the cycle of birth and death is described somewhat negatively as being within a state of samsara. Some degree of existential suffering and dissatisfaction are hallmarks of the cyclic existence of a jivā that thinks it is alienated from Brahman. The Upanishads present the ideal of spiritual growth as the release from samsara in terms of moksha and full realization of that which is meant by tat tvam asi.

Now, these primary terms of Brahman, ātman, dharma, karma, samsara, and moksha are offered only as a gloss. Tracing specific meanings of each term requires navigating how each is interpreted differently with the multitude of different schools within Hinduism, Buddhism, or Jainism; none of these are monolithic traditions and each has a its own maze of internal debates and distinctions. Nonetheless the Upanishadic notion of spiritual growth through inward reflection and meditative realization remains a common theme of dharmic religions. Out of all the dharmic religions, Hinduism most preserves the ideas of the Upanishads and the authority of the Vedas. For this reason, Hinduism is called an āstika, “orthodox” religion in India. Buddhism and Jainism reject the authority of the Vedas and many of its key notions, such as the idea of atman and other Hindu deities. Buddhism and Jainism are thus called nāstika “unorthodox” traditions. Finally, within the tradition of The Upanishads, moksha is presented to involve the deep, personal realization that ātman and Brahman are spiritually identical. The question of an underlying essence to things is of vital importance, then, because according to the Mahayana Buddhist position of Nāgārjuna, pursuit of realizing that ātman is Brahman is somewhat misguided. Instead, in Buddhism spiritual growth is generally interpreted as involving a letting go of attachment to confused notions of permanent essences. Moksha is thus thought of in terms of nirvana or release from grasping for essential permanence.

Nāgārjuna’s Madhymaka Buddhist Rejection of Ātman.

It is common to describe Buddhism and Jainism as developing out of Hinduism. And this is true – as much as Gautama Buddha (c 564/480 BCE – c 483/400) and Mahavira (599 BCE – c 527/425) developed Buddhism and Jainism (respectively) out of the context and rejection of mainstream religion at the time of The Upanishads. However, all religions evolve over time. So, this rough description should be qualified with the caveat that Hinduism, as it exists in its contemporary form, was also still under development while the “unorthodox” religions of Buddhism and Jainism were rejecting aspects of Vedic authority. A careful noting of the dates already provided by this chapter shows that Buddhism split off and experienced its own philosophical clarifications prior to the full completion of The Upanishads. For this reason, this chapter will now move onto to presenting Nāgārjuna’s 2nd or 3rd C CE  argument against the fixed reality of ātman and Brahman from the before moving onto Śańkara’s 8th C argument in favor of conceiving ātman and Brahman as expression of eternal essence.

As a quick recap, the Buddhist story goes that in the 5th or 6th century BC, Gautama Buddha meditated on the nature of samsara and the possibility of moksha. Rejecting both hedonistic nihilism and severe ascetism as practiced by some Hindu spiritualists, Gautama utilized what Buddhists call the “Middle Way” and arrived at what became, within Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths. These truths are 1) all existence is suffering, 2) desire is the root cause of such dissatisfaction, 3) desire can be overcome, and 4) such release is possible by following the Buddhist moral path – the 8-fold path. The Noble 8-fold path includes right thought, intention, action, speech, effort, mindfulness, and meditation. A key idea related to the first two of the Four Noble Truths is the notion that all things are impermanent and come and go in a flux of constantly changing conditions. Desire and clinging to stability in the face of impermanence is the way people cause the suffering that colors the experience of samsara.

Nāgārjuna is the founder of the Madhyamika (Middle Way) school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. He argues that emptiness, and thus impermanence, is an all-pervasive aspect of reality and is thus unavoidable. In defending this view, Nāgārjuna thereby attempts to present a coherent expression of the Buddhist worldview. The primary text under consideration is Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhymakakarika – or Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, a cannonical text within the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism. In the Mulamadhymakakarika, Nāgārjuna presents his argument for the ultimate emptiness of things, and the underlying pervasiveness of sunyata against the backdrop of the Buddhist tradition he follows.

Most of the Mulamadyhmakarika is dedicated to showing how various things we encounter in life, be it fire (chapter IX), our senses (III), action (XVII), the self (XVIII) or even Nirvana itself (XXV) lack a fixed and eternal essence. Nāgārjuna aims to demonstrate the dependent nature of these things by considering three positions relative to the broader topic. First, we have the nihilist position that says that nothing really exits. All is maya, or cosmic illusion. Under this nihilistic view, not only is everything an illusion, but how things really are stands in such a contrast to our notion of what is fundamentally real as to say that any given thing we can think of lacks any existence at all. A second, opposite position would hold an eternalist, fixed-essence thesis that some things are eternal, unchanging, and fully expressive of absolute existence. And example of this position would be the view that Nirguna Brahman expresses svabahava (the essence of necessary existence). Third, and this is Nāgārjuna’s view, there is a middle ground that states that all the objects and things that make up the universe do exist, but that at their core they are empty; a thing’s existence and nature is determined by its web of relations rather than an intrinsic core.

Nāgārjuna’s primary argumentative strategy in the Mulamadhymakakarika is a combined use of dilemma and reductio ad absurdum. Nāgārjuna repeatedly aims to show  how we hit a dilemma whenever we think in terms of essences through an all or nothing approach wherein we either a) give a fixed existence to a thing, or b) deny a thing’s existence. Throughout the Mulamadhymakarika, Nāgārjuna frequently presents two opposing philosophical positions, one that affirms a fixed existence and another that denies the existence of whatever it is that is considered in a particular chapter of the Mulamadhymakarika. From there, he proceeds to show that each position yields unappealing philosophical consequences, i.e. he makes the “all or nothing approach” itself face the horns of a dilemma. Over and over again, he attempts to show that each view not only leads to internal contradictions, but also, at its logical limit, must embrace its own opposing position; thereby illustrating the necessity of taking a middle position. Below is Nāgārjuna’s chapter on “Examination of Essences” in its entirety. Here, you can see how his strategy plays out regarding whether or not essences can be attributed to things, especially in terms of svabahāva or inherent existence.

1. Essence arising from

Causes and conditions makes no sense.

If essence came from causes and conditions,

Then it would be fabricated.

2. How could it be appropriate

For fabricated essence to come to be?

Essence itself is not artificial

And does not depend on another.

3. If there is no essence,

How can there be difference in entities?

The essence of difference in entities

Is what is called the entity of difference.

4. Without having essence or otherness-essence,

How can there be entities?

If there are essences and entities

Entities are established.

5. If the entity is not established,

A nonentity is not established.

An entity that has become different

Is a nonentity, people say.

6. Those who see essence and essential difference

And entities and nonentities

They do not see

The truth taught by the Buddha.

7. The Victorious One, through knowledge

Of reality and unreality,

In the Discourse to Katyāyāna,

            Refuted both “it is” and “it is not.”

8. If existence were through essence,

Then there would be no nonexistence.

A change in essence

Could never be tenable.

9. If there is no essence,

What could become other?

If there is essence,

what could become other?

10. To say, “it is” is to grasp for permanence.

To say “it is not” is to adopt the view of nihilism.

Therefore, a wise person

Does not say “exists” or “does not exist.”

11. “Whatever exists through its essence

Cannot be nonexistent” is eternalism.

“It existed before but doesn’t now”

Entails the error of nihilism.

(Mūlamadhymakakārikā, XV).

Nāgārjuna argues that an extreme position of nihilistic nothingness would undermine the Buddhist view that everything is impermanent and set up reality as having a fixed nature – that of nothingness itself – a view more fitting to the fixed-nature position. On the other hand, to assert an object exists that is permanently fixed by its essence would mean that it is un-caused. Given that everything that exists has a cause, and un-caused object would be a non-existent thing – a view more fitting to the nihilist position. Either position ultimately precludes the possibility of change itself. Nāgārjuna argues that because the polar alternatives collapse into self-contradicting versions of their alternative, the most rational position is the middle ground between the two; things exist, but they are what they are not due to some set essence but rather by their place in a web of relationships.

In the English language, to “reify” something means to take an abstract thing and treat it like a concrete particular thing. For example, to “reify” our idea of the perfect chair is to expect a really, real perfect chair to really be something upon which one could sit.  Nāgārjuna’s philosophical conclusion, flagged in this translation with the word “therefore” is that all things have a dependent nature, and we should not reify them. Nāgārjuna does not want us to reify “emptiness” and give it some sort of reified and thus “non-empty” nature. Nor does he want us to overly reify any of the common household objects of the world. To attribute too stable an essence to anything, even emptiness, contradicts the possibility of change, of impermanence, of nirvana, of, well, anything really. Nāgārjuna goes on to add that it is precisely clinging to permanent essences and to non-emptiness which forces one to inappropriately apply eternalistic concepts to the self (XVIII and XXVII).​

Śańkara’s Advaita Vedānta Deffence of Ātman.

Hindu philosopher Adi Śańkara (c 700 – c 750 CE) disagrees with the Mahayana thesis that emptiness characterizes nature of Ultimate Reality and the Self. He would not agree that moksha involves dropping the idea of an eternal, ātman self. Very importantly, Śańkara thinks he can point to a critical, non-empty, counter-example of something that possesses permanence and svabahāva: Brahman itself. Śańkara was a leading figure of the Advaita Vendānta school of Hinduism. “Vendānta” means “the following conclusion of the Vedas” and refers specifically to the philosophy of The Upanishads. “Advaita” is a conjunction of “vaitia” meaning dual and “ad” being its negation – so non-dual. (In transliterations of Sanskrit, he use of “a” as a negating prefix is similar to English and Latin; e.g., pathetic and apathetic or ātman and anātman. Keeping this in mind can be useful for sorting through Sanskrit terms.) The Advaita Vedanta school follows a close interpretation of The Upanishads and holds to a monistic pantheism. Everything really is one, and this one is the holy Brahman.

Śańkara is well aware of the Buddhist philosophy of sunyata and offers various critical arguments against the idea of complete pervasiveness of impermanence. Much of what has been recorded of Śańkara’s thought comes in the form of commentaries, bhāsyas, upon other eminent works. A key work by Śańkara is the Brahma Sutra Bhāsya, which is a commentary on the Brahma Sutra. Attributed to Bādarāyana, the Brahma Sutra nevertheless has an unclear origin and possibly cumulative completion from around 500 – 200 BCE. The Brahma Sutra is itself an aphoristic systemization of ideas from The Upanishads. One of Śańkara’s famous contributions to Indian philosophy is the thorough and rigorous explanation way in which Śańkara articulates, clarifies, and supports these ideas through his commentary.  In the Brahma Sutra Bhāysa, we find that in response to arguments such as those presented by Nāgārjuna above, Śańkara claims that we need to postulate some sort of essence to account for the regularity and consistency of dynamic processes. He writes:

The Bauddhas [Buddhists] say that from anything that is eternal and non-changing no effects can be produced; for that which does not change cannot give rise to effects. So they say that the cause undergoes destruction before the effect is produced. [They say] The seed undergoes destruction, and then the sprout comes out. In other words, existence springs from non-existence. The Sûtra [the Brahma Sutra] refutes this by saying that if it were so, then the assumption of special causes would be meaningless. Anything might spring from anything; for non-entity is the same in all cases. There is no difference between the non-entity of a mango stone and that of an apple seed. Consequently, we could expect and apple tree to come out of a mango stone. If there are distinctions between non-existences, with the result that the non-existence of a mango stone differs from that of an apple seed, and therefore they produce certain results, then they will no longer be non-entities, but something positive. (Brahma Sutra Bhāsya, 2.2.26 p 195-6).

Here, Śańkara tries to put the sunyata doctrine in a bind. If mango pits and apple seeds are fundamentally empty, they are fundamentally the same. But if they are the same, we’d have no reason to expect consistently different botanical results from the two different plant seeds. Any factor attributed to mango pits and apple seeds to distinguish these otherwise empty objects would, however, be a positive and durable property that undermines the emptiness thesis.

Śańkara makes a similar argument against the anātman thesis that says that ultimately our mental experiences have no self underwriting them. For example, yesterday I recall being happy and excited about the sunny weather. Today I feel a little muted by the rain I see outside, and I hope that tomorrow will be sunny, that and I will be excited again. All of these observations and feelings are different moments and attributes unified as aspects of a particular life, which is the life of my particular self. “Unless there is a permanent principle connecting the past, present, and future, there cannot be remembrance or recognition of an experience originating at a particular time and place” (2.2.31 p 199). Śańkara  argues that some permanent “self” must be postulated to explain how we experience the procession of different moments as a continuum that occurs with a specific point of reference – the subject of one’s life: one’s self.

Śańkara goes on to further argue for the permanence of the self as an intelligent being. In a passage that foreshadows Descartes’s “I think therefore I am” and dream thought-experiment, Śańkara claims that any veridical state of the self requires a reflective intelligence to observe or “see” that state. Quoting the Brahma Sutra, Śańkara writes,

[I]ntelligence is its [the individual soul’s] very nature, and is never altogether destroyed, not even in a state of deep sleep or swoon. “That it does not see in that state is because although seeing then, it does not see; for vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not a second thing separate from it which it can see . . . Therefore it is not true that its intelligence is lost, for it is impossible. . .  Were intelligence really non-existent then, who would be there to say that it did not exist? How could it be known? Moreover, he who says that he did not know anything in deep-sleep, must have been existent at that time. Otherwise, how could he remember the condition of that state? Hence the intelligence of the Self is never lost under any condition (2. 3. 18, p 223).

Advaita philosophy asserts that for any sort of mental activity, or anything known, there is a knower. For example, if it is known “that it is raining,” then there is a knower of this. When we reflect on the precipitous weather, knowledge of both the rain and of its being reflected upon likewise assumes a “knower-subject” that enables this dual relationship. According to Śańkara, the self, as the “I” of reflection, is immediately available whenever one reflects. Ātman, then for Śańkara, stands as the perpetual that-which-is-aware of all potential states that assume a subject. The variety of senses, thoughts, feelings, observations, and activities that one experiences are fleeting and change. However, what it is to be consciously aware of such things is a constant aspect within all this flux. Therefore, the Advaita philosopher argues, something unchanging and eternal, ātman, is evident by very act of awareness itself. Much as the presence of the “I” was a precondition for doubt and thought in Descartes’s cogito (“I think, therefore I am) Śańkara and the Advaita Vedantins hold that the ātman is a precondition for conscious awareness. And, ultimately, by inherently participating in conscious awareness at the core of our being, we express our deeper unity with Brahman as both svabahāva and satchitāndam; sat (Existence), chit (Consciousness) and ānandam (Bliss).

Nāgārjuna and other Buddhist philosophers are aware of this line of argument, and often rebut it by denying that whatever is disclosed through reflection is an atomic awareness. The Buddhist might claim that there isn’t much evidence to go beyond the impression of a collection of thoughts, feelings, and impressions in the first place.  As His Holiness the Dalai Lama contests, “whenever we examine physical, mental, or abstract entities, we find as a result of a reductive analysis nothing but their unfindability. So, you can’t really speak coherently of identity or of entities. This is the fundamental teaching of Mādhyamika” (Columbia University, 1994; cited in Garfield, 1995, p 252 n97).

Conclusion

Questions regarding the nature of the self and its potential relationship with ultimate reality are central to various positions within Dharmic religions. Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist argument and Śańkara’s Advaita argument stand as examples of how issues regarding the self and essence relate to broader topics within philosophy of religion. However, such questions and positions extend beyond debates from ancient and medieval India. Establishing the necessary existence of an inner self and using that position for leverage regarding other religious questions such as the existence of a soul or even God has its own tradition within more Abrahamic oriented philosophy of religion with tremendous overlap regarding studies from the philosophy of mind. Ibn Sīnā, aka “Avicenna” (1381), Descartes (1641), and Kant (1787) all set forth arguments for either the necessity of an “I” or at least the necessary possibility of its being added to any thought. On the other hand, a tradition of skepticism regarding an internal self also has been voiced and supported by strong argument and adroit introspection from philosophers such as David Hume (1748) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1957).  The relevance of an inward search for a possible deeper self, and its presence of emptiness therefore stands as an example of different forms of philosophical inquiry can be included within the philosophy of religion.

References

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Dalal, Neil, “Śaṅkara”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/Śańkara/

Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy. (Trans. D Cress) 3rd Ed. Hackett. First Published 1641.​

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